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Press Commentary
"The Clarence Thomas Confirmation: A Retrospective"
by The Honorable Laurence 14. Silberrnan'
Now that almost a year has passed since the nomination of Clarence
Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
it seems an appropriate time to reflect on the events. There is much for me
to remember. Clarence Thomas Is my friend, and my wife was one of his
most outspoken proponents and defenders during his confirmation, sc I admit
to have suffered at the misery inflicted upon him. But confirmations-as I have
said before--are political, and therefore federal judges should not be heard to
express a view as to the right way either interest groups or senatorc should
go about supporting or opposing nominees.
It is, on the other hand, very much the business of federal judges to
comment on the manner in which other judges behave during a confirmation.
My proposition, which once would have been thought non-controversial,
indeed rather obvious, is that judges assiduously should avoid public
Involvement In this intensely political arena.
Of course the nominee, under present conditions, has no alternative but
to become something very much like a political candidate during the endless
weeks between his or her nomination and the Senate hearings. If the nominee
does not seek to marshal support with the help of political institutions, he or
she risks being crushed and personally destroyed. Nevertheless, in my view,
that necessary political posture should never be allowed to affect subsequent
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decisionmaking as a Supreme Court justice.
Nomlbees to the Supreme Court, or, for that matter, to any federal
court, shoulk, therefore, refuse to answer questions in the confirmation
hearings that bear even indirectly on controversies that will come before them.
The notion that It is perfectly appropriate to discuss the doctrinal batsis of a
class of cases, so long as the nominee avoids explicitly saying how he or she
would cast a vote In a concrete case, is, in my view, fatuous. Going down
that road, one can quickly say so much as to make a final step unnecessary.
Moreover, the reason it Is Inappropriate to indicate a vote in a particular case-
-that It undermines the Integrity of the subsequent adjudicatory process and
the Independence of the judiciary-applies equally to general discussions of
doctrine. In either event, the nominee, under oath, is led to restrict his or her
future freedom of decisionmaking, which is necessarily unfair to litigants. If
one Is forced, to use the famous example, to swear fealty to the right of
privacy recognized in Gifswold v. Connecticut, is not he or she psychologically
hampered if, subsequently, as a justice, he or she heears an argument that
seeks to limit or even reexamine Griswold's premises? Many.would say that
Is perfectly all right because of their strong view of the merits of Griswold, but
it should be recognized that this Is not a principled position. It is -actually
much worse for a nominee to answer these kinds of questions in the crucible
of confirmation hearings than it would be to give a public speech on the
subject. An answer to a senator's question could be seen to be a qruid pro
quo for a confirmation vote, putting a future justice or judge in a more -difficult-
position to offer the requisite open mind to litigants.
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It might- be thought that this is strictly a matter for any norminee to
decide, looking only to his or her conscience, but I would disagree. The type
of confirmation dialogue we have suffered through, and now have come to
expect, as I have said, threatens the independence of the judiciary. All judges
have an Interest In protecting that independence.
I realize that, after the Bork hearings, and subsequent confirmations, the
"purist" position has become difficult to hold to, but it is time to call s halt to
the slide. Recent nominees have been astonishingly resourceful in seeking to
avoid confirmation commitments, but it gets harder and harder. Justice
Thomas' deft use of the phrase "I have no quarrel with that decision,"' which,
of course, is exactly what any open-minded judge who has not yet read briefs
attacking a precedent should say, will, I am afraid, no longer suffice. I do not
blame senators for asking searching questions, the answers to which I believe
improper. The responsibility to decline Is the nominee's, but he or she
deserves the full support of the judiciary and the bar,
I wish to focus this talk, however, on another aspect of the confirmation
process: the proper public role for judges regarding the appointment of other
judges or justices. Unfortunately, the intensity of the battle over the
confirmation of Justice Thomas led judges to cut the mooring lines that should
have restrained them from drifting into the political fray. Perhaps most
striking, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit wrote an op-ed piece in
The New York 77rmes at the height of the struggle, urging the President to
withdraw the nomination and to nominate instead another black judge from
the Second Circuit who is, like Judge Newman, a Carter appointee. I do not
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see how it could possibly be suggested that Judge Newman's dramatic entry
into the intense political controversy was appropriate conduct for Vi federal
judge. Yet, I saw no public criticism of his extraordinary action. Not from the
bar, not from the law schools, and certainly not in the press.
After Justice Thomas was confirmed, another circuit judge, this time
from the Third Circuit, former Chief Judge Leon Higginbotham, wrote Justice
Thomas an open letter, soon thereafter published in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review. The letter can only be described as a political
polemic. which, among other things, attacked Justice Thomas' statements
when Chairman of the EEOC and the positions of American conservative
political figures such as Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. The
letter's patronizing tone, telling a new justice how to vote, was surely in
shockingly bad taste, but its political cast-it could have served nicely as an
election campaign speech--breached any conceivable standard of judicial
ethics. Again, not a word was raised in protest by the bar, nor in academia.
And the press covered Judge Higginbotham's screed with unconcealed
admiration and delight.
For some of us on the D.C. Circuit, the incident relating to the Thomas
confirmation fight that reflected most poorly on the judiciary was the
unprecedented and dishonorable leak of the substance of a preliminary draft
of one of then-Judge Thomas' opinions. It is, of course, likely that this
violation of the confidentiality of the court's deliberative process was
committed by one or more judicial clerks. But we know that the reporter
sought to persuade clerks to violate their ethical obligation by arguing that the
4
judge, or-judges, for whom they clerked would approve the leak. That
suggests that It is also likely that the clerk, or clerks, who did so believed that
they were acting consistently with their judge's wishes, whether or not that
was true.
Whatever the leaker's exact motive, and it surely included the desire to
Injure Justice Thomas' confirmation prospects, our court, In my judgment,
made a profound mistake in not Investigating the matter. Retired Chief Judge
Gibbons was surely right when he said publicly at the time "that the judges
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should Immediately
take steps to Identify the source of the,. . . report." We should have used,
as did the Senate, a special counsel retained for that purpose. It cannot
seriously be argued that a court is powerless to respond, and thus is unable
to discourage future leaks of preliminary positions on cases sub judice.
Sometimes those cases have enormous economic, social, and political
consequences. Disclosure of preliminary positions of a judge or judges not
only undermines the work of the court, which necessarily must take place in
confidence, but it also disserves the interests of litigants and the public. As
for the expressed objection that an investigation would have failed to identify
the guilty, and so was not worth trying, that is a peculiar view for those
responsible for upholding the law. In any event, 11 am quite certain an
investigation would indeed have pointed rather easily to the leaker or leakers.
It seems that Mr. Fleming's effort on behalf of the Sonate turned out to be
more fruitful than early press accounts revealed--as readers of The Wal Street
Journal and The Washington imes editorial pages learned.
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There -has been a good deal of confusion as to exactly what the D.C.
Circuit did about our leak. Two misImpressions have spread. One is that the
issue of an investigation is still alive, and the other is that the Chief Judge
somehow had authority, which he exercised, to block an investigation.
Neither is true. We actually decided the question last November In a formal
manner when we voted 6-6 (with a senior judge voting as has been our
practice) to defeat a motion to conduct an investigation. Thereafter, our
deliberations concerned only whether we would disclose our decision--and the
vote--to the public.and, it so, in what manner. I thought, and still do, that,
given the public importance of the issue, we all had an obligation to tell the
public what we decided. There cannot. however, be any valid objection to my
open disclosure of our decision now, especially after we have seen - a
newspaper account that purports to describe the views of judges (distorted
I might add) expressed in that private session. It certainly would have been
much better if we had announced our decision forthrightly as a court at the
time the opinion issued. I have not been able to discern any good reason why
the court (or, for that matter, Individual judges) should not disclose its (or
their) position on such an Issue.
In any event, notwithstanding the unprecedented and obviously
damaging nature of the leak, again, I did not see any criticism from the bar,
academy, or the press as to our inaction. I suppose it was to be expected
that the press would not readily bite the hand that feeds It. The Legal 77mes,
the recipient of the leak, sought to protect its source not only from
identification but also, In clever ways, from any rebuke. I wonder, however,
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whether if this. sad event had occurred during the nomination of a judige with
an apparently different approach to judging, the press would have beien more
probing and more critical.
All of these episodes that reflect badly on the judiciary ocoiurred in
connection with Justice Thomas' nomination, but we see -other disquieting
signs that federal judges are willing to engage openly in public criticism of the
Supreme Court in a political fashion. Recently, Judgo Noonan of the Ninth
Circuit wrote an op-ed piece, again, not surprisingly, In The New York 7imes,
openly disagreeing with the Court's recent disposition of the Robert Alton
Harris case, in which the Ninth Circuit was ordered to stop efforts to interfere
with Harris' execution. Judge Noonan even accused the Court of causing the
Ninth Circuit to commit "Treason to the Constitution." If I am right that this
sort of behavior is stunningly inappropriate, and also unprecedented, we must
ask, why is it occurring now? What is it in our present environment that
causes judges to cut the tacit and explicit ethical restraints that had been
thought to prevent such conduct?
To answer the question, one must think about what It is that influences
judges once they are appointed. I mean, of course. what influences them
other than parties' arguments in litigation and the expected consultation with
other judges. We can discount out of hand the organized bar, and not totally
to Its discredit. Lawyers, after all, are not in a particularly advantageous
position to influence the behavior of judges. Time was when scholarly
criticism at our law schools had some impact. Not so today. AmericMn law
schools have changed dramatically in only the 30 years since I left Harvard.
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Whereas then. there was a broad consensus within the faculty, across the
political spectrum, as to the appropriate role of judges, that consensus fell
apart In the '60s during the heyday of the Warren Court. Now, many of our
most competitive law school faculties are dominated by those who wholly
reject the basic premise that animated legal scholarship in 1 960--that judges
are in the business of trying to discern and apply neutral principles. For those
professors, judicial decisionmaking is simply a charade, masking oppression.
Thus, the law reviews today are full of articles exploring endless varialions on
a Marxist theme. All that is necessary to comprehend the author's concept
is to understand how he or she measures the oppressed class. Most law
reviews have therefore become virtually irrelevant to judges.
Judges do, however, hire law clerks every year, and .clerks are recent
products of the law schools. Of course clerks do influence judges--sometimes
all too much. One of my former clerks told me of an ad'vocacy group meeting
a few years ago at a prominent law school where a faculty member who had
clerked for a Supreme Court justice told the group exactly how this particular
justice had been manipulated over the years-captured, if you will--by his
activist law clerks. Not surprisingly, given the overwhelming endorsement of
various kinds and degrees of judicial activism in the law schools, the supply
of potential clerks who believe in, indeed even comprehend, notions of judicial
restraint does not begin to match the number of incipient judicial activists.
Law clerks are not, to be sure, directly responsible for inducing judges
to engage in inappropriate political activity. They can, however, subtly
reaffirm the notion that the outcomes of judicial activism are so important that
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virtually anything is justified to protect those decisions. To put it another
way, judges, or nominees, who believe in a more limited role for the judiciary
are thought in the academy to be in some sense illegitimate. Therefore, recent
graduates may reinforce the view that illegitimate means can be used to
oppose them so as to preserve activist precedents.
Still, I believe the more important influence and the key explanation for
the recent misbehavior of judges is the press. Mr. Dooley said, as you will
recall, that judges follow the 'lection returns. That is not really so. They, of
course, owe their appointments to the electoral process, but in pest decades
the courts, perhaps particularly the Supreme Court, have seemed to take pride
in ignoring popular will. Federal judges have instead appeared parlicularly
prone to listen very carefully to the views of what has been described as the
"new class" or, lately, the "chattering classes." In the United Stateis, that
very much means the press.
It is a commonplace that in a democracy we expect the press to patrol
the abuses of government officials. Certainly the press often performs that
role. Why, then, has it not restrained judges from getting into the political
disputes I have described? Why Is It that these judges know in their bones,
if you will, that a certain kind of public utterance or action, regardless of its
impropriety, will not be questioned? The answer, as I have foreshadowed, is
that the American working press has, to a man and woman, accepted and
embraced the tenets of judickil activism. Unlike the law schools, wheire one
can still find a few professors who assert the virtues of Judicial restraint, I
have never met a legal reporter who holds to that view. Some columnists and
editorial writers. to be sure-but no reporters. -And the-cumulative weight of
American legal reporters overwhelms those few columnists or editoriall writers
whose opinions are openly on display.
I once thought that was so because journalists covering the courts are
primarily non-lawyers and might therefore be thought to be interested only In
cases as policy issues. But the truth is that the lawyer/reporters are among
the most unbalanced-the least abashed at asserting the value of judicial
activism. The worst, in my view (with the notable exception of the "wicked
witch of the airwaves"), are found in the pages of The New York rimes,
whose general news coverage in recent years has seemed to approach a daily
version of The Nation. We never realized how much discipline Abe Rosenthal
exercised until he retired and the advocates were allowed to run free. It
seems that the primary objective of the Times' legal reporters is to put activist
heat on recently appointed Supreme Court justices. Torn Sowell has described
this technique as the "Greenhouse Effect,- after the 77mes' leading court
reporter. Their Washington second stringer, Mr. Nell Lewis, covers our court,
and his reporting is so obviously distorted and tendentious that it reads as if
it were a cross between the columns ot his namesakes, Anthony and Flora
Lewis.
The Tmes Is by no means unique. All American newspapers, with a
uniformity that is found with respect to other subjects that a judge does not
discuss publicly, conform generally to the same line. The Wall Street Joburnal-
-under the direction of its always opinionated Washington Bureau Chief Al
Hunt-The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, the Associated Press,
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and virtually all other papers and newsmagazines are only a step behind (I
exempt. of course, the editorial pages). The working press covers the federal
courts, indeed any American courts, as if judicial decisions were simply the
extension of polltics by other means. As Justice Scalia has remarkod, they
seem uninterested in the reasoning of opinions-which should be even more
important than the result since it is the reasoning that is really law. And
rather obviously they approve of only certain kinds of results.
It has occurred to me that one could draw a parallel between modem
judicial activism and what could be called journalistic activism. Both likely
stem from the new class' impatience with the workings of American
democracy in the latter half of the twentieth century. If one believes that
reporters have some sort of obligation to seek objectivity in reporting, both
could be thought an abuse of power. But one probably cannot draw from the
First Amendment the same sort of corollary obligation to neutrality that one
must certainly take from Article Ill. Journalists have the legal right to be as
partial as they wish; it may be that there is no ethical obligation restraining
partiality, either. In any event, I doubt I have standing to raise that issue,
except to note the hypocrisy with which journalists discuss the matter. I can,
however, legitimately describe the nature of journalistic reporting .n the
judiciary because It has an impact on judicial behavior.
Since it is virtually impossible doctrinally to defend judicial activism in
a democracy, the strategy of those journalists who wish to support judicial
activism is to deny the possibility of judicial restraint--to challenge the notion
that there is anything to the pursuit of neutral principles, or, alternatively, to
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so use the terms as to hopelessly confuse debate. It reminds me very much
of my experience in foreign policy. Communist and Third World opponents of
democracy would never frontally attack the concept. They would instead seek
to debase the currency by misusing the term. Thus, "democracy" was used
often to refer to coercive methods to achieve relative equality of nominal
income. My particular favorite, though, was the phrase the Communists
Invented to describe dictatorial decisionmaking: "democratic centralism." I
expect that, in the same Orwellian fashion, this speech criticizing judges for
political interventions will, in tum, be described as "political."
Reporters will often describe an opinion they dislike as "activist" when
it strikes down an act of Congress as unconstitutional. If one believes that
the Constitution is positive law, rather than a delegation to a continuing
constitutional convention, that charge is, of course, silly. Or sometimes we
see a court described as activist for overruling prior precedent--particularly
when the earlier decision was itself the product of press-approved judicial
activism. A decent respect for precedent Is, to be sure, an element of judicial
restraint, but the care notion infusing that philosophy is that judges are not
pollymakers and should as much as humanly possible eschew policy choices.
When a precedent is based on nothing more than such a policy choice, it may
be imprudent, but It Is hardly activist, to vote to overrule that case.
The press' ceaseless advocacy of judicial activism not only induces
judges to misbehave in the manner I have described, but it also has its Impact
on judges' decisionmaking over time. When I served in the Executive Branch,
I watched the press shape the behavior of senior appointees. Some, it
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seemed, allowed their entire daily agendas to be set by the morning papers.
The desire to curry favor with and avoid criticism from the Washington press
corps outranked, for many, loyalty to the President or respect for Congress.
I do not think I fully appreciated, until I became a judge, however, how
much impact press coverage can have on Judges. Of course those of us who
had been Involved in judicial selection watched with great disappointment as
judges seemed to change on the bench, or, as the press would say, "grew."
It was quite frustrating to see those particular jurists come to accept and even
relish the temptations of activism. They were rewarded by being described
approvingly as "non-ideological"-deciding each case on its merits-which, as
far as I can tell, meant that they were expected to reshape the law eaich time
to conform to a desired outcome. (Ironically, hard core Warren Court-type
activists are never described as ideological.)
So, I understand better today the reason for the evolution of some
judges. More often than not it is attributable to their paying close attention
to newspaper accounts of their opinions. You would be amazed at how thin-
skinned some judges are. That Is why the Reagan Justice Department was
so determined at the outset of that Administration to pick academics for the
federal judiciary-particularly for the Courts of Appeal:s-those persons who
had developed a settled view of the appropriate judicial role and would not
lack the intellectual confidence to hold to it under expected criticism.
That brings me back to Justice Thomas. He was.. of course, not a law
professor, and through his years of service in the Executive Branch he
certainly-as would be expected in light of his positions-experienced rigorous,
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even ruthless, press attacks. The President, when he announced-his intention
to nominate Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, nevertheless, described
him as the best person available. There are a number of individuals who
would make excellent Supreme Court appointments, but I think the-President
was right. Not only does Clarence Thomas-as all the world now knows-have
the courage of a lion, he also has the kind of Intellectual integrity that
constitutes a solid foundation from which he cinnot easily be pushed. But,
in one vital respect, Justice Thomas is absolutely unique, amply justifying the
President's characterization. He is the only judge I know who is impervious
to the press influences I have described. He has, for some time, resolutely
refused to read the newspapers. There will be, I would bet my shirt, no
journalistic hole bored in his intellectual ozone level. This time, there will be
no "Greenhouse Effect."
[6/10/92]
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First Amondment
Does media coverage influence the outcome of judicial decisions?
Federal Court of Appeals Judge Laurence
Silberman of the District of Columbia is not one to
mince words. In a recent ipeech before the
conservative Federalist Society, he stuck it to the
Fourth Estate, accusing journalists of favoring
judicial activists when they cover the courts.
. Even worse, noted Silberman, some members
of the bench pander to this prejudice by tilting to
the left when they decide cases.
While a chorus of journalists blasted the judge
for his own brand of activism, we put this explosive
proposition-that judges make law with an eye to
the headlines-to two constitutional scholarn:
commentator Bruce Fein and College of William
and Mary law professor and First Amendm-nt
specialist Rodney A. Smolla. .
Fein argues that Silberman is right in msying
that the press dotes on liberal judges, but he urges
ther to resist the bait and decide cases on
conscience.
Smolla, however, doesn't accept Silbermian's
premise and uses the news coverage of the judge's
speech to illustrate the media's neutrality and
dedication to principle.
Yess.The Press Loves Activists
BY BRUCE FEIN
Both direct evidence and human
nature corroborate Judge Laurence
H. Silberian's indictment of the
media for its complicity in judicial
activism.
The majority of print and broad.
cast journalists celebrate activist do-
cisions. They are obsessed with re-
sults, not with principles of con-
stitutional or statutory interpretation
that prevent judges from usurping
legislative or executive prerogatives.
Supreme Court nominee Robert
H. Bork was widely criticized for
interpreting OSHA to permit em-
ployers to exclude fertile women
orn jobs that would endanger fe-
tuses. By contrast, last June, the
media lauded Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy for his opinions
invalidating voluntary prayers at
high school graduation ceremonies
and reaffirming the Roe o. Wade
abortion decree.
Again. in Panned Parenthood
v. Casey. Justice Harry Blackmun
urged the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee to block any nominee to the
Supreme Court Uncommitted to Roe.
That unprecedented effrontery was
politely received by then media be-
cause Blackmun's cri de coeur fur-
thered the cause of activist jurispru.
dance. But how would the media
have reported an exhortation by Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia to deny conflrna-
tion to Supreme Court candidates
reluctant to overrule Roe?
Similarly, Chief Justice -Earl
Warren and Associate Justice Wil-
*UABA JOURNAL / OCTOBER 1992
lian 0. Donlas were regaled thr
their activist decisions that undercut
the text and purpose of various con-
stitutional provisions. Their regular
reliance on notions of fairness, ema-
nations and penumbras went su-
pinely unquestioned by journalists.
By contrast, Justice John MarshallHarlan, whose. less ebullient juri.
prudence was graced with deep con-
titutional learning. recied the prom-
inence of an extra in a Cecil B.
DeMille extravanas.
Most recently, the joint plural-
ity opinion ofJus tices Kennedy. San-,
dra Day O'Connor and David Souter.
in Casey expressly Justified their
votes by the fear that overruling Roe
would be portrayed in the media as a
surrender to anti-abortion advocates.
S*esage 1edlUews
And a federal judge in Wichita
recently appeared on "Nightline" to
garner favorable coverage of his in-junction against picketing of abor-
tion clinics by Operation Rescue.
Another federal judge in the District
of Columbia smilarly turned news-
paper columnist to defend his AT&Tdivestiture decree. Who can deny
that the media enjoys a seat in thejudicial cloister?
As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes warned in Northern Securi-
ties Co. u. United States (1904). great
cases. like hard cases. make bad law
"because of some accident ofimmedi-
ate overwhelming interest which ap-
peals to the feelings and distorts thejudgment.
.What makes a case of *over-
whelming interest," of course, is the
media coverage it attracts. And that
coverage characteristicaldy promises
media flattery for actirist judicial
decisions, but pejorative prose for
rulings that denyjudicial social engi-
neering ower.
Who wants -marty2dom for up-
holding the Constituti n's separa-
tion of powers or long-h4eaded princi-
ples of interpretation that are deni-
grated as "esoteilc" or "arcane" by
reporters intoxicated vith results?
Who wants to risk a me aia beating a
Ia Judge Bork in a Senate confirms-
tion hearing?
Only a diminishiuig number dii-
play the Intellectual incorruptibility
of Socrates and, thus like Judge
Silberman. unflinchingly risk media
obloquy and a seat on the Supreme
Court to safeguard tonstitutional
truths.
That is healthy neither for en-
lightened law nor the public weal.
Constitutional principles, by defini-
tion, stand above media kudon or
public opinion polls. "Lb paraphrase
Justice Robert Jacksorn, their vitality
should not turn on the vicissitudes of
political controversy .3r journalistic
passions. Of course, n judge should
not reject a constitutio nal interpreta-
tion becuse it may evoke media
plaudits; but neither should a judge
resist an interpretation because it
might agitate the media.
The principal parpose of judi-
cial life tenure is defeated when
decisions are corrupted by the antici-
pated reportorial resrponses of trib-
unes for activism. 1
No: A Pat Thesis
BY RODNEY A. SMOLLA
In a provocative speech Judge
Laurence H. Silberman recently at-
tacked the manner in which the
press reports on legal issues. claim-
ing that there is at work a journalis-
tic activism" set on advancing an
agenda of "judicial activism."
Although he singled out The
New York Timea and its Supreme
Court correspondent Linda Green-
house, his indactment was more sweep-
ing, writing that "the American work-
ing press has, to a man and a woman,
accepted and embraced the tenets of
judicial activism." He attacked jour-
nalists for treating courts as political
institutions. "as if judicial decisions
were simply an extension of polities
by other means," and claimed thatjournalists overemphasize the mere
results of decisions, and seem unin-
terested in the reasoning of cases.
The facts do not support these
claims. Take as a first exhibit the
actual texts of the "next-day" stories
that the major American newspa-
pers and wire services run on Su-
preme Court decisions.-They gener-
ally oncapsulate the facts, the result,
the core doctrinal and policy judg-
ments that comprise the majority.
concurring, and dissenting opinions.
and attempt to offer a balanced
assessment (often quoting from ex-
perts with opposing viewpoints) of
the likely impact of the decision.
The stories tend to be generous
in their quotations from all justices
who write opinions, and fair in their
selection of quotes. Legalism like
"strict scrutiny" or the "Lemon test"
are distilled and made comprehensi-
ble. And the daily news coverage of
the Court tends to go out of its way
not to be judgmental.
Take as a second exhibit the
longer analytic pieces that appear in
the mainstream press. For example,
since Judge Silberman singled out
Linda Greenhouse, I will cite her. On
the Court's controversial hate-
speech decision this term. Green-
house wrote: "The fault line that
split the Court reflects a debate with
deep roots in political theory and the
history of the First Amendment ...
between those who see f*ee speech as
an end in itself and those who see it
as a means to an end."
On the evolving identity of the
Court, Greenhouse wrote: "So if there
is a constraint on the new majority, it
may come down to this: Ideas that
are inviting as theory, and that gain
majority opinion that could change
the way people live as well as how
they view the Court."
Jewrmalistle Balance
Judge Silberman and Linda Green-
house do have different ideological
and jurisprudential values; but cer-
tainly it is unfair to attack Green-
house's writing (oi that of her col-
leaues in other news organizations)
by intimating that it lacks intellec-
tual honesty, analytic probity orjournalistic balance.
I also have observed first-hand
how these news reports are con-
structed. Like many scholars. "lib-
eral" and "conservative" (including
my friend Bruce Fein), I often get
called for reactions to cases. These
are invariably arms-length, thought-
minded, adversarial exchanges. Thejournalists are vigorous in their cross-
examination; they instinctively react
against attempts at "spin control';
they press me to defend positions
much like a good judge will press a
lawyer in oral argument.
When I later read the piece, I
am usually impressed by the writer's
atteupts to sort out the often confus-
ing and controverted implications of
a new landmark decision.
Judge Silberman's speech had
many good points, including some
well-taken insights into the confir-
mation of Justice Clarence Thomas.
But along the way he pointedly
criticized his "activist" colleagues,
law clerks, law professors and law
reviews (the latter, for "exploring
endless variations on a Marxist
theme").
One of the saddest aspects of
the whole Thomas nomination spec-
tacle was the tendency on all sides to
resort to hyperbole and ad homninem
attack. Judge Silberman's thought-
fAl views on "activism" are welcome
additions to our ongoing American
debate about the role of courts. But
whatever our viewpoint, it does not
advance the cause of enlightening
public discourse to caricature the
arguments of people with whom we
disagree. or to simply "blame it on
the prese." 0
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Does the Court Play to the Press Gallery?
Three large boxes gathering dustunder my desk are testimony to theincreasin  role of the press in judi-
cial nominations.
I call them the Robert Bark Box, the
David Souter Box. and the hopelessly
bulging Clarence Thomas Box (Anthony
Kennedy seemed to merit only a large
folder). Each is filled with the dozens of
reports, position papers, attacks, and
analyses prepared by interest groups and
academics in defense of or in opposition to
these nominees.
Unlike reporters on other beats around
town, Supreme Court reporters are un-
accustomed to being lobbied or stroked.
On a political beat, stories are read
closely, and feedback is common. But Su-
preme Court and other legal stories res-
onate only rarely; reaction is uncommon.
Yet when a high court vacancy arises,
the paper begins to flow. With each new
nomination, the number of pages seems to
grow exponentially. Strategists will tell
you that how the press plays these nomi-
nees is of increasing importance in in-
fluencing the debate and the outcome.
But not until last week has anyone sug-
gested publicly that the press also in-
fluences the judges and justices once they
get on the bench. Critics. notably Justice
Antonin Scalia, have attacked the press for
how it covers the courts. But not even
Scalia has suggested that our coverage in-
fluences how judges reach their decisions.
That was. however, the provocative
thesis of Judge Laurence Silberman's
wildly well-received speech before the
Federalist Society at Washington's May-
flower I itd June 13. (For the text ofSil-
bernne'.s speech. see "Verbatim,' Page
14.)
Silberman. a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, suggested
Tony Mauro covers the Supreme Court
and legal issues for USA Today and the
Gannett News Service. His column on the
Court appears every other week ins Legal
Times.
that every reporter he has met who covers
the courts believes in judicial activism
(more on that later) and that a disturbing
number of judges have been nudged into
the activist frame of mind by the press.
Silberman offered few specifics, saying
afterward that "I don't think it would be
appropriate" to mention actual cases orjudges influenced by the press. He did
mention the increasing number of federal
judges, mainly Carter appointees. who
find their way into the op-ed pages of
newspapers with views that, Silberman
said. clearly go beyond what is appropri-
ate for judges to say. "I can't imagine
Learned Hand writing an op-ed piece,"
Silberman commented later.
We all know judges who seek to curry
favor with the press. And it is true that
Carter appointees, feeling frustrated with
the sharply different views of their Reagan
and Bush colleagues, have turned to the
press more and more, so that their opin-
ions can have some currency somewhere.
But can it be possible that these judges.
with the protection of life tenure, actually
shape their decision-making with an eye
toward receiving favorable mention in the
press? It is frankly difficult to imagine.
As reporter Linda Greenhouse of The
New York Times. one of Silberman's
named targets, says in an interview, "I've
never gotten the sense that anyone on the
bench has been led around by the nose by
the press."
Yet Silberman definitely struck a re-
sponsive chord when he said it. and com-
ments I've heard from lawyers and others
since the specch suggest that he was giv-
ing voice to a concern privately held
by many judges throughnut the federal
judiciary.
In an interview after the speech. Sil-
berman said that this sort of influence by
the press definitely exists, "and it
shouldn't be a surprise. . . . You have a
lot more impact than you think."
He explained it this way: "Judges are
pretty isolated. They don't talk to lawyers;
in some instances, they are forbidden to.
Laurence Silberman Journalists
have subtle effect on some judges.
So often, when they write an opinion. it
drops off the face of the earth. They never
hear about it. Some judges need to see
some reaction, so they look to the press."
Silberman is clearly right that judges
should not be playing to the crowds, de-
ciding cases on the basis of how the press
or public will react. And it would be fool-
ish to deny that many reporters. con-
sciously or not, tend to look at judicial is-
sues through a liberal lens. When conser-
vative judges make bold rulings, they ten
to be described disparagingly as "idei
logical." When liberals do the same thinj
they are called "principled."
But Silberman's assertion that the pre,
exerts anything like the influence he suL
gests needs further fleshing-out. The ur
predictability of federal judges-from th
Supreme Court on down-ends to di:
prove his theory.
And Silberman needs to be careful n(
to take his point so far that he ends u
advocating a know-nothing approach i
judging. He came perilously close at th
close of his Federalist Society speed
when he heaped praise on Justice Thorns
for his steadfast refusal to read newspapef
at all.
"He is the only judge I know who i
impervious to the press influences I hav
described," Silberman said admiringi,
"There will be, I would bet my shirt. n
journalistic hole bored in his intellectu;
ozone level."
Refusing to buckle under to outsid
pressure is one thing. Sticking one's iea
in the sand is quite another.
The Greenhouse Effect
Judge Silberman's provocative poii
was obscured somewhat by his unfort
nate personal attacks on reporters who. h
said, are taking advantage of their her<
tofore uncharted powers to push the coun
toward activist decision-making.
lie singled out the reporting of Nc
Lewis of The Ne, York Times. descrihin
it as "obviously distorted and tender
tious." But Silberman did not mentio
the likely source of his animus towar
Lewis-namely a 1991 article on disses
sion within the D.C. Circuit that reporte
that Silberman had once threatened to a
sault Judge Abner Mikva. (See "Silkb
man. Dogged by Story. Provides Detai
of Outburst." Legal Times, March I
1991. Page 7.)
SEE COURTSIDE, PAGE
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-le seems to thrive on animosity."
offers Lewis. "A couple of years ago. he
tried to engage mc in a dchac hy mail
flbout another story Lewis had wrilteni. I
found his letters so churlish and loopy that
I stopped responding to them."
Much to the amusement of his audi-
ence. Silberman also childishly criticized
Linda Greenhouse by speaking of the
"Greenhouse effect," a phrase first
coined in this context by economist and
columnist Thomas Sowell. Never mind
that justices ranging from William Bren-
nan Jr. to William Rehnquist have written
and spoken admiringly of Grcenhousc's
reporting for The New York Times.
Silberman added a few more names to
Greenhouse is at
a loss to explain
which articles
triggered
Silberman's
wrath.
his enemies list before he was done: The
Wall Street Journal (its reporters, not its-
simpatico editorialists). The Washington
Post. the Los Angeles Times. and the As-
sociated Press. He even referred to the
-wicked witch of the airwaves." appar-
ently a veiled reference to Nina Totenberg
of National Public Radio.
Greenhouse, who is in her I Ith term as
court correspondent for the Times, says
she found Silberman's attack "basically
baming"-and disturbing as well.
"I trust he is not seeking to use his
4.)
Reporter Linda Greenhouse dis-
agrees with Silberman's thesis.
position to chill or delegitimize pene-
trating coverage of the federal courts,"
she says.
Greenhouse adds that she has had little
contact with Silberman over the years and
is at a loss to account for which articles
triggered his wrath. She disagrees with his
thesis and holds no brief for activism.
"There are quite a few activists on the
Supreme Court now." she says.
And Greenhouse denies Silberman's
assertion that in the post-Rosenthal era at
the Times-referring to the years since
Executive Editor Abe Rosenthal stepped
down-journalistic advocacy has "run
free."
The Power of the Pen
Judge contends colleagues become activists to please the press
It used to be that federal judges tually have an influence on judges charge that liberal law professors
were seen and not heard; any who "desire to curry favor." send left-wing students to clerk and
speaking they had to do was in an "The press's ceaseless advocacy influence judges.
opinion, and any disagreement with of judicial activism not only induces Howard conceded that judges
a colleague was settled in chambers. judges to misbehave in the manner I are "pleased when the academy
In recent years, however, fed- have described [by writing for op-ed thinks well of their opinions and
eral judges have been heard when the press has nice
a lot. Members of the bench, things to say about them,
from the Supreme Court on but the notion that they are
down, have tossed hand gre- influenced in any substan-
nades at each other in tive way is far-fetched.
speeches, opinions and on "I don't see any evi-
op-ed pages ofAmerica's larg- dence of that."
est newspapers. Some have Silberman did get spe-
even granted interviews to- cific in naming reporters and
heaven forfend-reporters. newspapers that he consid-
Now, in a recent ered biased. He included the
speech, Judge Laurence Sil- usual suspects, such as The
berman, of the U.S. Court of Washington Post and The
Appeals for the District of New York Times, and added
Columbia, has taken his col- a new one: the Associated
leagues to task for those Press, a wire service that
public breaches of judicial historically has been known
etiquette. for cut-and-dry reporting.
The speech was deliv- James H. Rubin, who
ered in Washington, D.C., has covered the Supreme
before the conservative Fed- Court for the Associated Press
eralist Society. Perhaps for 10 years, said he would
aware of the irony of the be "shocked" to find that
chosen forum, Silberman took what he wrote had any influ-
pains to point out his salvo ence on judges.
was different. Rubin said the source of
At the end of a dis- the judge's displeasure is "a
course on judicial activism mystery to me." Reporters at
and the twisting oflanguage, the AP "pride ourselves on
Silberman added, "I expect being fair and unbiased," he
that, in the same Orwellian said. "It's what we strive
fashion, this speech criticiz- for."
ing judges for political inter- 'Tbny Mauro, in a col-
ventions will, in turn, be Some judges "desire to curry favor." umn for Legal Times, sug-
described as 'political.'" -judge Laurence Silberman gested a motive for Silber-
Regardless, Silberman man's attack on the objectiv-
has some interesting and novel pages, for example], but it also has ity of Neil Lewis of The New York
points to make, as well as some its impact on judges' decision-mak- Times. It was Lewis who wrote last
perplexing ones. ing over time," he said. year that Silberman had threatened,
In addition to covering such "I do not think I fully appreci- perhaps without intent, to punch
familiar territory as the sorry state ated until I became ajudge, however, Judge Abner Mikva in the nose.
of the judicial confirmation process, how much impact press coverage can Lewis recounted the incident a
"Marxist" law reviews, and law have on judges," he said. second time in a story on philosophi-
clerks who try to subvert their bosses, "Of course, those of us who had cal differences amongjudges written
Silberman developed the thesis that been involved in judicial selection about two weeks after Silberman's
a symbiotic relationship exists be- watched with great disappointment speech.
tween the judiciary and the press. as judges seemed to change on the The dean of Washington, D.C.,
Liberal American newspapers, bench-or as the press would say, legal writers, Lyle Denniston, a Bal-
he complained, "conform to the same 'grew.' It was quite frustrating to see timore Sun reporter who has covered
line. The working press covers the those particular jurists come to ac- the Supreme Court since 1958, de-
federal courts, indeed any American cept and even relish the temptations fended the right for judges to be
courts, as if judicial decisions were of activism." opinionated.
simply the extension of politics by Silberman offered no specifics -I think everybody has a First
other means." for his assertion, which A.E. "Dick" Amendment right to express them-
Howard, a University of Virginia law selves on any subject, including fed-
Influential Words professor and former Supreme Court eral judges who have little sympathy
Most astonishing was Silber- law clerk, called "an unprovable prop- for the First Amendment," he said.
man's assertion that journalists ac- osition." He likened it to the old -Henry J. Reske
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Press is a puzzler
with abortion 'spins'
If you found this week's Supreme Court decision on abor-
tion a bit baffling, you probably can blame it on your news-
paper.
Many headlines across the USA read as though they were
written by pro-choice or anti-abortion activists rather than
journalists. Examples of the contradictions:
0 The Miami Herald: "Court affirms abortion rights"
10 The Orlando Sentinel: "Court weakens abortion rights"
po The (Oakland) Tribune: "Roe reaffirmed"
0 USA TODAY: "High Court
reins in 'Roe'"
>0 San Francisco Chronicle:
"Court upholds right to abor-
tion"
>o Chicago Tribune: "Ruling
weakens abortion right"
I' Houston Chronicle:
"Court limits access to abor-
tion"
Those headlines and many
others misfired a little to the
left or right These two may
have been the most pointed
and most pointless:AL 1> Star Tribune (Minneapo-NEUHARTH lis): "Abortion ruling lands in
USA TODAY FOUNDER middle"> New York Newsday:
"Abortion ruling 5-4"
Most journalists try to be objective. But they are human
(honest!): Therefore the "spin" they put on a story or head-
line sometimes reflects their own preferences or preju-
dices.
Former Editor in Chief of USA TODAY John C. Quinn
once quipped that a newspaper's philosophy, policy and
style would show through even in the ultimate story - the
end of the world. He predicted these headlines:
0 The New York Times: "World Ends. Third World coun-
tries hardest hit"
I' The Washington Post: "World Ends. White House ig-
nored early warnings, unnamed sources say"
>' USA TODAY: "We're Dead! State-by-state demise,
Page 8A. Final, final sports scores, Page 6C' -
Wiseacre Quinn and the abortion headlines send the
same signal: Don't believe everything you read. And be sure
to look beyond the headlines.
Abortion ruling sends
the networks racing
CNN set the scene at 10 a.m. ET/7 a.m. PT Monday with
pictures inside the Supreme Court of dozens of reporters
awaiting the ruling on the Pennsylvania abortion case.
Minutes later the decision was out Network legal corre-
spondents had little time to read the thick decision but still
had to report the fndings. "There is no way to prepare for
something this complicated," says CBS correspondent Rita
Braver. "I just happened to turn to page 6 where the (spou-
sal) notification provision was."
ABC did not air a live picture, opting for Tim O'Brien on
the phone. "I was at my desk just a few feet from the press
room," says O'Brien. "It may have given us another 10 or 15
seconds" to look at the ruling. O'Brien did slip on the notifi-
cation provision, but anchor Peter Jennings quickly made a
correction.
Each network also had legal experts on hand. Winner of
the preparedness award goes to CNN, which had packaged
reports plus live debate on Crier & Co. Two gofers helped
CNN's Anthony Collings.
"We had two runners, one
familiar with the workings
of the court and someone
else who was a little more
fleet of foot who ran outside
in a 15-second sprint to
where Collings was stand-
ing," says CNN vice presi-
dent Earl Casey. (Abortion
ruling, 3A)
News Management at Supreme Court? Not Guilty!
By Ruth Marcus lineup announced by the court inw~~gm ~ uu Wtev . ~one particularly indecipherableWashmas Pos~tff Wnter
labor law case last month:M ost of official Washington "Justice Blackmun announced the
spends its time trying to judgment of the Court andM figureout howto get dumgup=out how te. eoldlivered the opinion of the Courtmaimum ress covrae. Should with respect to Parts , , I-B,
the president speak on prime Ill-C IV-B (except for the final
time? Should the report bie
embargoed for release in "TV-F, in which Rehnquit..r.
Monday's papers, when there is 
-_and hite, Marshall and Stevens,
little competing news? Can the ii.. joined, and an opinion with
senator crank out the statement respect to Parts 1TT-A and IV.
in time for the-evenirig news? the final paragraph of Part TV-B,
There are nine excepticis to and Parts TV-C and V, in which
this rule. They are all sitting on Rehnquist, C. and White and
the Supreme Court. Stevens, ii., joined.
Once again, as the court races "Marshall, J., filed an opinion
toward its summer recess, the RMNuRG-r.EWA94TON MST concurring in part and dissentingjustices are demonstrating their in part. Scalia, j. filed an opinion
total UIUnofeie ~lto any involving First American Batik tstopped to relingate iF-W~aT r.*. MIM i.-nudr t-hl
armblance of news management. ' w c udiialy iewe& pprtAnd dissenting in part, in
grumbling about it still hasn't come d.g which O' nn ifd.iterUflgrublig  it -So court reporters arrive at the agency made with respect to an joined, and in all ut rarFTH11-oT
This is the court's busiest time court on decision days this time of age-discrimination claim." which Kennedy, J., joined.
of year, with 25 rulings to get out year feeling-or at least imagining The fourth: a case only a Kennedy. J., filed an opinion
within the nexl few weeks. that they feel-something like securities lawyer could love, concurring in the judgment in
For reporters who cover the M o bsfore the play uhzday was enly zmginalL 'rt and disting in part
court, this is their month to get on Only to fd themselves? so far, better. The justices took the Got it?
the front page as the court, day out of luck, bench again and quickly deflated The news flood may have
-*fter-dsyrissues momenteu- Othe-last- ree days tha they iiiy-hopes-of mmeeeiting-news,- crested-o thelastTayoftbe erm
decisions on the pressing legal have issued decisions, the justices issuing (yet another) bankruptcy in June 1988, when the court
-issu.o#the-iiedut-things havcoup Wl I not Td 'inibnfiiirinii-edeaI issued nine decisions-pholding
aren't quite working out that way. fondly referred to as "dogs"-the sentencing guidelines and a the independent counsel law; .
Granted, this is a slow term at kinds of rulings that will be lucky if consideration of the difference forbidding capital punishment of
the court, with the justices they get an inch of newsprint, that between the Fifth Amendment people under 16; and issuing major
having taken a few dozen-cases Are hard to hype onto Page 29, no right to counsel and the Sixth rulings in the areas of sexual
less than usual. Still, there are a less the front page. Amendment right to cdunsel that abuse of children, employment
number of cases of major interest Take last week. Please, even the dissenters said was ol discrimination, church-state.
remaining on the docket: Monday opened with four little practical significance but that relations-and labor law. Making it
Does the Constitution protect decisions, all unanimous. (This is did have the redeeming feature of through the day was the Supreme
one's right to dance without- already a bad sign.) coming-on the 25th anniversary of Court reporter's _quivalent a
pasties and a G-string? Can news One of the cases is about the the Miranda ruling. triathalon.
organizations be sued for time limits for winning parties in The spate of rulings in The justices. beseeched by
manufacturing quotations? For Social Security cases to submit relatively minor cases means thur reporters to spread out the news,
breaking their-promises-to-keep -their-requesrtort Iees--&, Th remaining important 
-hoW 561clifaldocWaiig7
their sources confidential as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ecisioncould-allbe announced They say the decisionsimply
Can someone be thrown in mellifluously summarized it, in the space of four days, come out as they are printed and
prison for life without pareleif V'viiethet -- - . istratwe o
caught with a pound of cocaine in decision rendered following a two more. That means they true that the hardest cases can
his car? Should the court overrule remand from the District Court is won't get the attention they take the longest to decide, and to
itself..JL an let X~~ja ulroiiud gmen w-nnte .~serve, witnout-enougri room in IMM rfroT'
cases hear testimony about the meaning of EAjA." the newspaper to accommodate a Also, they have life tenure.
murder victim's character? Another concerns "whether a full recounting, and reporters will Down in the press room.
Does the Voting Rights Act debtor can include a mortgage lien be forced to speed-read opinions reporters have to content
cover judicial elections? Can state in a-Chapter 13 bankruptcy like Evelyn Wood on themselves with dreams ofjudges be forced to take reorganization plan once the amphetamines, winning the annual pool about
mandatory retirement at age 70? personal obligation secured by the This-is particularly fun when when the terrm will end. andwith
Can police board buses and ask -mortgagedpropertyhasbeen hecourtissuesonenLits how many ruings.passengers to let thesisearch discharged in a Chapter.7 ITu
luggage for drugi Proceeding." concurrences and pluraliti- and June 27. seven decisions, and 18
Some of these cases have been The third: "Whether claimants Justice Antonin Scalia signing separate opinions. But the last
awaiting a decision since they under the Age Discrimination in onto all but the next to last number-counting concurrences
were argued in November. One Employment Act of 1967, as Paragraph of part three. and dissents-is probably overlyimportant securities law case amended, are collaterally Here, for example, isl the optimistic.
-~- .paragragili), IV-D,-- . an
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Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson. Whiting. Lacy, and Hassell, JJ.,
and Cochran, Retired Justice
The Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury decision of the
United States Supreme Court concerning taxation of fed-
eral retiree pensions is not to be applied retroactively;
state law does not require refunds, but grants prospective-
only application to decisions that Invalidate a taxing
scheme, and the unavailability of refunds includes the taxyear 1988. The trial court's judgment in these consoli-
dated cases is affirmed.
Taxation - State - Constitutional Law - Intergovernmental Tax Immu-
nity - Supremacy Clause - Retrospective Application of Holding - StatuAtory Construction - Code § 58.1-1826 - Tax Year Defined
In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), the SupremeCourt of the United Sates declared that state taxation of pension income of
retired federal employees, while exempting from taxation pension income of
retired state employees, violated the doctrine of intergovernmental tax im*
munity embodied in the supremacy clause of the Constitution and, there.fore, was constitutionally prohibited. The Supreme Court, however, did notdecide whether the decision had retrospective application, and these cases
were brought by retired federal employees who receive either federal pen-
sion benefits or military retired pay. They filed suits in the trial court
against the Virginia Department of Taxation seeking refunds, pursuant toCode § 58.1-1826, for state income taxes paid for tax years 1985-1988. Thetrial court ruled that Davis should be applied prospectively only, and that
the plaintiffs were not entitled to refunds. Plaintiffs appeal.
1. Whether a constitutional decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is applied ret-
roactively is a matter of federal law and, in the civil context, retroactive
application is governed by the test announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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2. In another case, the Court found that its earlier decision invalidating a state
highway tax established a new principle of law under the commerce clause
and that its decision should not be applied retroactively.
3. On the same day, the Court held that a clear and certain remedy, which
could include refunds, was required to remedy a state's unconstitutional li-
quor tax statute because the state could hardly claim surprise when its stat-
ute was invalidated.
4. In the present case, nothing in the record suggests that the Commonwealth
acted other than in good faith reliance upon a presumptively valid taxing
statute. Therefore, the Chevron test must be employed to determine whether
the Davis decision should be applied prospectively only.
5. For a decision to be applied non-retroactively, the first prong of the Chevron
test requires that the decision establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed.
6. The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine was grounded on the proposi-
tion that states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden or in any manner control, the operations of the federal government.
7. Pre-Davis cases invalidating state taxing statutes were decided on the pro-
position that the tax had a foreseeable and direct effect on some operation of
the federal government.
8. In the present case, it is difficult to discern how the General Assembly of
Virginia should have been expected to perceive that the scheme of exempt-
ing state pensioners from state taxation would have placed any direct bur-
den on some federal operation.
9. The Davis decision established a new rule of law by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, and the first
prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.
10. The second prong of the Chevron test requires a court to weigh the merits
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in ques-
tion, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further
or retard its operation. Since the purpose of the intergovernmental tax im-
munity doctrine already has been fully served, and applying Davis retroac-
tively would do nothing either to retard or to further the doctrine's purpose,
the second prong of Chevron is satisfied.
II. The record supports the conclusion that allowing the requested refunds
would have a potentially disruptive and destructive impact on the Common-
wealth's planning, budgeting, and delivering of state services.
12. The equities weigh heavily in favor of the Commonwealth in terms of disal-
lowing retrospective application of Davis. Thus, the third prong of the Chev-
ron test is satisfied.
13. Accordingly, under the Chevron test, the Davis decision is not to be applied
retroactively.
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14. Code §§ 58.1-1825 and -1826 provide that any person assessed with any tax
administered by the Department of Taxation and aggrieved by any such
assessment may within three years from the date such assessment is made,
apply to a circuit court for relief.
15. Because theDavis dedision is not to be applied retroactively, the pre-Dais
assessments were neither erroneous nor improper within the meaning of
Code § 58.1-1826.
16. The Virginia Supreme Court has previously held that its ruling declaring a
taxing scheme unconstitutional is to be applied prospectively only. Consider*
ation should be given to the purpose of the new rule, the extent of the reli.
ance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new rule.
17. The last day for filing income tax returns is not the date on which income
taxes are assessed for the preceding year. Rather, when the year has ended,
the tax for that year was fixed and ascertainable. Only payment was delayed
until the date on which payment was due.
18. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that tax liability depends upon the occur*
rence of the taxed transaction or the enjoyment of the taxed benefit, not the
remittance of the tax.
19. Under the Chevron test, the Davis decision is not to be applied retroactively,
state law does not require tax refunds, but grants prospective-only applica-
tion to decisions that invalidate a taxing scheme, and the unavailability of
refunds includes the tax year 1988.
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JUSTICE STEPHENSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989),
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that state taxa-
tion of pension income of retired federal government employees,
while exempting from taxation pension income of retired state
government employees, violated the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax imminity embodied in the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. The Supreme Court, however, did not
decide whether its decision in Davis had retrospective application.'
In these consolidated appeals, the appellants (collectively,
Harper) are retired federal employees who receive either civil ser-
vice retirement benefits or military retired pay. They filed suits in
the trial court against the Virginia Department of Taxation (the
Commonwealth) in May 1989, seeking refunds, pursuant to Code
1 58.1-1826, for state income taxes paid for tax years 1985, 1986,
1987, and 1988. After consolidating the several suits, the trial
court ruled that Davis should be applied prospectively only and,
therefore, that Harper was not entitled to the refunds. Harper
appeals.
In this appeal, the principal issue is whether Davis should be
applied only prospectively, thereby denying the refunds, or retro-
actively, thereby granting the refunds.
I
[1] Whether a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court is
applied retroactively is a matter of federal law. American Truck-
ing Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. - , , 110 S.Ct.
2323, 2330 (1990). In the civil context, retroactive application of
such decisions is governed by the three-pronged test announced in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Smith, 496 U.S.
The Supreme Court did not consider this issue because Michigan conceded that "to
the extent appellant has paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is entitled to a
nsfund." Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
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at , 110 S.Ct. at 2331; see U.S. v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,563 (1982).
[2] InSmith, the Supreme Court considered a state's taxing
statute that previouqly had been declared unconstitutional under
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 496 U.S. at
, 10 S.Ct. at 2329. The Court denied the claimant's requestfor a refund of taxes paid prior to an earlier decision that invali-dated the taxing statute. Id. at - , 110 S.Ct. at 2334. In sodoing, a plurality of the Court employed the three-pronged Chev-
ron test and concluded that its earlier decision should not be ap-plied retroactively. The Court found that its earlier decision inval-idating an Arkansas highway tax, American Trucking Assns., Inc.
v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), established a "new principle oflaw" under the commerce clause. Id. at . , I10 S.Ct. at 2332.Arkansas's legislature, therefore, was justified in relying upon ex-isting precedent and had "good reason to suppose" the enactment
of the tax would not violate the Federal Constitution. Id. atI10 S.Ct. at 2333.
Harper contends, nonetheless, that "because the taxes at issuehere . . . constitute[d] an 'unconstitutional deprivation,' . . . Vir-ginia must provide 'backward-looking relief' to the refund claim-
ants." Harper asserts that such relief is required by the holding inMcKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,
- U.S. - , 110 S.Ct. 2238 (1990).[3] In McKesson, decided on the same day as Smith, the Su.preme Court held that a "clear and certain remedy," which couldinclude refunds, was required to remedy Florida's unconstitutionalliquor tax.statute. - U.S. at , 110 S.Ct. at 2252. In soholding, the Court rejected Florida's contention that its taxing au-thority implemented the tax preference scheme "'in good faith
reliance on a presumptively valid statute.' " Id. at , 110 S.Ct.at 2254. In rejecting that contention, the Court stated that thechallenged tax statute "reflected only cosmetic changes from theprior version of the tax scheme that itself was virtually identical tothe Hawaii scheme invalidated" in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,468 U.S. 263 (1984). Thus, the Court concluded, Florida "[could]hardly claim surprise" when its later statute was invalidated. Id.
at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2255.
[4] In the present case, nothing in the record suggests that theCommonwealth acted other than in good faith reliance upon apresumptively valid taxing statute. We conclude, pursuant to
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Smith, that the three-pronged Chevron test must be employed to
determine whether the Davis decision should be applied prospec-
tively only.
A
[5] For a decision to be applied prospectively only, the first
prong of the Chevron test requires that the decision "establish a
new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on
which litigants may have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."
404 U.S. at 106. Satisfaction of this first prong usually has been
stated as the "threshold test" for determining whether or not a
decision should be applied prospectively only. Johnson, 457 U.S.
at 550 n.12.
When Davis was decided, 23 states had statutes similar to the
Michigan statute.2 Virginia's statute had been in effect for almost
half a century. See Acts 1942, c. 325. As far as the record shows,
the federal pensioners had paid the tax without protest. Not a sin-
gle federal pensioner had brought an action during that period in
a Virginia court seeking a refund of taxes on the basis of the in-
tergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The absence of such liti-
gation reasonably may be explained by examining the doctrine's
origin and development.
[6] The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine had its gene.
sis in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)The doctrine was grounded on the proposition that "[s]tates have
no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden oi
I See Ala. Code Sections 36-27-28 and 40-18-19 (Supp. 1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. AnnSection 43-1022 (Supp. 1988); Ark. Code Ann. Section 26-51-3206; Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec
tion 39-22-104(4)(f) and (g) (Supp. 1988). Ga. Code Ann. Section 48-7-27(a)(4)(A(Supp. 1988); Iowa Code Ann. Section 97A.12 (West 1984); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 74
4923(b) (1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 16.690 (Michic/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988)La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 47:44.1 (Supp. 1989); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Section 206.30 (1988)Miss. Code Ann. Section 25-11-129 (1972); Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 86.190 and 104.54(1986); Mont. Code Ann. Section 15-30-111(2) (1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. Section 10-11
145 (1978); N.Y. Tax Law Section 612(c)(3) McKinney (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. Sectio135-9 (1988); Okla. Stat. tit. 68 J 2358 (1988); Ore. Rev. Stat. Section 316.680(1)(c) an.(d) (1987); S.C. Code Section 12-7-435(a), (d), and (e) (Supp. 1988); Utah Code AnrSection 49-1-608 (1989); Va. Code Section 58.1-322(C)(3) (Supp. 1988); W.Va. CodSction II-21-12(c)(5) and (6) (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Section 71.05(I)(a) (Sup;1988).
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in any other manner control, the operations [of the federal govern.
ment]." Id. at 436.
[7] The pre-Davis cases invalidating state taxing statutes were
decided on the proposition that the tax had a foreseeable and di-
rect effect on some operation of the federal government. See, e.g.,
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983)
(state tax that imposes greater burden on holders of federal obli.
gations than on holders of similar state obligations impermissibly
discriminates against securities issued by federal government);
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376
(1960) (state tax that imposes greater burden on lessees of federal
property than on lessees of other exempt public property imper.
missibly discriminates against federal government). Indeed, Davis
states that intergovernmental tax immunity is based on "the need
to protect each sovereign's governmental operations from undue
interference by the other." 489 U.S. at 814.
[8-9) In the present case, therefore, it is difficult to discern how
the General Assembly of Virginia should have been expected to
perceive that a statutory scheme, exempting state pensioners from
state taxation, would have placed any foreseeable and direct bur-
den on some federal operation. Consequently, we conclude that
the Davis decision established a new rule of law by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed. Thus, the first prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.
B
[10] The second Chevron prong requires a court to "weigh the
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospec*
tive operation will further ornretard its operation." 404 U.S. at
106-07. In applying this factor, we must determine whether the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine will be retarded or fur-
thered by retroactive application of the Davis decision.
The purpose of intergovernmental tax immunity is not to pro-.
vent legitimate 4tate .taxation. See Smith, 496 U.S. at ... , 110
S.Ct.4it 2332. Virginia's taxing statute was legitimate until a new
tile as nqouped in,Davjs..As soon as the General AssemblyWiAlne aware ot the Davis decision, it acted to correct the defects
in its statute. See Acts 1989,-Special Session II, c 3. As a-result,.
the purpose of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine al*i
ready has been fully served, and applying Davis retroactively 3
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
241 Va. 232 (1991)
239
would do nothing either to retard or to further the doctrihe's pur-
pose. Therefore, the second prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.
C
The' third prong of the Chevron test requires a 'court to
"[weigh] the inequity imposed by retroactive application." 404
U.S. at 107. In weighing the equities, considerable deference must
be accorded a state's reliance upon a statute that was presump-
tively valid. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). In-
deed, "[i]t is well established that reliance interests weigh heavily
in the shaping of an appropriate equitable remedy." Id. at 203. As
Chief Justice Burger so aptly stated in Lemon, "statutory or evenjudge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely
in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. This fact of le-
gal life underpins our modern decisions recognizing a doctrine of
nonretroactivity." Id. at 199.
An important equitable consideration is the effect that retroac-
tive application of a judicial decision may have on a state's finan-
cial stability. As the Smith plurality acknowledged, applying a ju-
dicial decision retroactively may "have potentially disruptive
consequences for the State and its citizens. A refund, if required
by state or federal law, could deplete the state treasury, thus
threatening the State's current operations and future plans." 496
U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2333.
In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073,
1105 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the State of Arizona's
voluntary pension plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Court further held, however, that the state's liability
would be prospective only. Id. The Court found that retroactive
liability could cost the, state hundreds of millions of dollars. As
Justice Powell stated, "[i]mposihg such unanticipated financial
burdens would come at a time when many States and local gov-
crnments are struggling to meet substantial fiscal deficits." Id. at
1106-07. Because the illegality of Arizona's actions had not been
deciared until Norris was decided, Justice Powell further stated
that "[t]here is no justification for this Court . . . to impose this
magnitude of burden retroactively on the public." Id. at 1107.
, (11] In the present case, the record discloses that retroactive
' application of the Davis decision would give rise to a potential tax
,refund liability, inclusive of interest, of approximately
$440,000,000. This liability would come at a time when the Com-
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nI althis altcdy,.stroggling to meet, enormous fiscal deficits.Te, rcord contains affidavits of Commonwealth officials that sup.port the 6nclusion that allowing the requested refunds wouldhave a potentially disruptive and destructive impact on the Con.
monwealth's planning, budgeting, and delivery of essential state
services.
Harper contends, nonetheless, that "it is simply more equitable
to place the financial consequences . . . upon the government(and thus the whole body of taxpayers) than upon a small sub-
class of taxpayers who had unconstitutionally been forced to paythe tax in the first instance.".. Thus, Harper asserts, "taxpayerswho have been paying more than their lawful share of taxes
should be reimbursed by those who have paid less."The Commonwealth counters by pointing out that "hundreds ofthousands of other Virginia taxpayers have paid. taxes on their pri-vate pension income but have no claim for monetary relief." TheCommonwealth further asserts that "over 2.5 million Virginiansannually have paid their 'fair share' of taxes while only some sixtythousand state and local retirees were excluded from pension in.come taxation."
[12] The record supports the Commonwealth's assertions, andwe conclude that, on balance, the equities weigh heavily in favorof the Commonwealth. Consequently, the third prong of the Chev-
ron test is satisfied.
[13] Accordingly, we hold that, under the Chevron test, the Da-vis decision is not to be applied retroactively. Accord Bass v.State, 395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990).
[14] Harper contends, nonetheless, that the refunds are due asa matter of state law. He relies upon Code §§ 58.1-1825 and
-1826. Code § 58.1-1825 provides that "[any person assessedwith any tax administered by the Department of Taxation andaggrieved by any such assessment may . . . within three yearsfrom the date such assessment is made, apply to a circuit court forrelief." Code § 58.1-1826 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If the court is satisfied that the applicant is erroneously orimproperly assessed with any taxes, the court may order that'the assessment be corrected. If the assessment exceeds theproper amount, the court may order that the applicant be
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exonerated from the payment of so much as is erroneously orimproperly charged, if not already paid and, if paid, that itbe refunded to him. If the assessment is less than the properamount, the court shall order that the applicant pay theproper taxes and to this end the court shall be clothed withall the powers and duties of the authority which made theassessment complained of as of the time when such assess-ment was made and all the powers and duties conferred bylaw upon such authority between the time such assessment
was made and the time such application is heard. The court
. may order that any amount which has been improperly col-lected be refunded to such applicant.
Harper asserts that, even if the Davis decision applies prospec-
tively only, the federal retirees are entitled to refunds under Code158.1-1826. Harper argues that, because the assessments are un-constitutional, they also are "erroneous or improper."f15] We reject this argument. We hold that, because the Davisdecision is not to be applied retroactively, the pre-Davis assess-
Ments were neither erroneous nor improper within the meaning of
'Code § 58.1-1826.[16] Harper's state-law contention also fails for another reason.W previously have held that this Court's ruling declaring a tax-ing scheme unconstitutional is to be applied prospectively only.Perkins v. Albemarle County, 214 Va. 240, 198 S.E.2d 626, af'dend modified on rehearing, 214 Va. 416, 200 S.E.2d 566 (1973).*We adhere to our holding in Perkins. In so doing, we follow thecriteria stated in Fountain v. Fountain, 214 Va. 347, 348, 200S.E.2d 513, 514 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974), that
'consideration should be given to the purpose of the new rule, theextent of the reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the admin-
tration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule."
The case of Capehar: v. City of Chesapeake. No. 5459 (Circuit Court, City of Chesa.ke, decided Oct. 16, 1974). foiiowed Perkins. in Capehan,. more than one hundreduapycrs in the City of Chesapeake, who had been subjected to the same practice that washajidated in Perkins, brought suit in circuit court seeking, among other things, refunds ofit txes "iiiegally and unconstitutionally assessed." The City demurred, citing Perkins.1k circuit court sustained the demurrer, being of opinion that the case was controlled byMims. We. denied Capehart's petition for appeal, 215 Va. xlvii, and Capehart's petitionfircrtiorari raising due process grounds was denied by the Supreme Court, 423 U.S. 875
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See also Quick v. Harris, 214 Va. 632, 634, 202 S.E.2d 869, 871
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975).
' * III
[17] Finally, Harper contends that "even if Davis were applied
prospectively only, refunds for 1988 taxes would nonetheless be
due, for they were not assessed, and in many cases were not paid,
until after Davis was decided." (Emphasis in original.) Davis was
decided on March 28, 1989. The last day for filing individual in-
come tax returns for the 1988 taxable year was May 1, 1989.
Harper claims that the last day for filing income tax'returns is the
date on which income taxes are assessed for the preceding year.'
We do not agree.
Income taxes are "imposed on the Virginia taxable incomefor
each taxable year of every individual." Code § 58.1-320. (Em-phasis added.) The taxable year ended on December 31, 1988,al.
most three months before Davis was decided. When the year en-
ded, the 1988 tax was fixed and ascertainable. Only payment of
the tax was delayed until May 1, 1989. Code § 58.1-341.[18] The Supreme Court rejected a similar contention in Smith.
The Court reasoned that tax liability depends upon the ." 'occur-
rence of the taxed transaction or the enjoyment of the taxed beno.
fit, not the remittance of the tax.' " Smith, 496 U.S. at , 110S.Ct. at 2335. As Justice O'Cohner observed,
[a] contrary rule would give States a perverse incentive to
collect taxes far in advance of the occurrence of the taxable
transaction. It would also penalize States that do not imme-
diately collect taxes, but nevertheless plan their operations on
the assumption that they will ultimately collect taxes that
have accrued.'
Id. at -, 10 S.Ct. at 2336*
Harper's reliance upon Code § 58.1-1820 is misplaced. Section 58.1-1820 defines"as
sessment" as that term is used in Article 2 of Chapter IS, which establishes limitatioeperiqds for variotis forms of relief. Individual incomeitax liability is established in Articisqf Chapter 3.
i For the same reason, we reject the contention in Lewy (Record No. 90070)'titi
trial court erred in denying injunctive relief that would have barred the Commonwcabbifrom filing any action to collect taxes from those who, after the Davis decision, had refused
to pay the 1988 taxes. : e
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
241 Va. 232 (1991)
243
IV
[19] In sum,.we hold thati (1) under the Chevron test, the Da-
vis decision is not to be applied retroactively, (2) state law does
not require tax refunds, but to the contrary, grants prospective-
only application, tQ decisions that invalidate a taxing scheme, and
(3) our denial of refunds includes taxes due for the tax year 1988.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
Record No. 900770-Affirmed.
Record No. 900792-Affirmed.
p.
